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AN ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNTS
RECEIVABLE AS A SECURITY
DEVICE
VERNON X. MILLER
A N assignment of accounts receivable is a popular security device.'
The lender agrees to extend credit to the borrower and he demands
security. The borrower agrees to pledge the accounts on his books to
secure the loan. He furnishes the creditor with a formal list of the
accounts. He agrees to furnish additional lists at specified times in the
future. It is assumed by both that if the debtor does not pay when the
loan matures the creditor can reach the accounts. Apparently the debtor
can carry on business as usual and the creditor is protected against the
debtor's insolvency. There are no papers to be filed. Accounts receiv-
able are "intangibles." Subsequent creditors, it is asserted, are not
"misled" by any "reputed ownership" in the debtor.2
This appears to be an ideal security device for creditor and debtor.
It seems to carry with it no burdens and few risks. But the Supreme
Court of the United States has enunciated the doctrine of "unfettered
use"' 3 The creditor must be careful. A mere "assignment" will not pro-
tect him if his debtor defaults.4
All assignment cases are not alike. There are professional lenders
and there are non-professional lenders. There are banks which carry
the debtors' regular commercial accounts. And there are professional
finance companies whose business is money-lending but who do not
carry their debtors' bank accounts. Among the debtors there may be
retail distributors, manufacturers and jobbers. The accounts may be
large or small, many or few. They may arise by reason of sales out
of stocks of goods regularly made in the course of trade, or by reason
of special orders to be filled in time according to particular specifica-
tions. The accounts assigned may be those presently on the books;
I Little has been written on assignment of accounts. Many of the cases are diffi-
cult to analyze. Frequently the opinions do not disclose what there is in the
records to indicate how the various transactions between debtors and creditors
have been carried out. The courts are not objective about "unfettered use."
Consequently the citations in this article cannot always be precisely in point
with the text. But the schemes suggested in the text do represent more than
hypotheses. They represent what are believed to be predictions that are logic-
ally and functionally acceptable and based upon the propositions declared in
the few leading cases.
2 Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U.S. 513, 34 Sup. Ct. 166, 58 L.ed. 339 (1913) ; In re
Michigan Furniture Co., 249 Fed. 978 (S.D. N.Y. 1918).
3 Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 45 Sup. Ct. 566, 69 L.ed. 991 (1925).
The word "assignment" is used both legally and descriptively throughout the
text. It should appear from the context how it is used each time.
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or a series of advances may be contemplated, or a series of renewals,
and the parties may bargain about future accounts.
The leading case is Benedict v. Ratner.5 There the creditor was
a non-professional lender. At least he was a private individual, a rela-
tive of one of the persons interested in the borrowing firm. The debtor
already owed the creditor $15,000 when the new agreement was made.
The creditor agreed to advance another $15,000, and eventually did
so. The debtor gave the creditor its notes and also gave him a list of
the accounts then on its books. The debtor agreed to furnish additional
lists of new accounts at specified monthly intervals. And the debtor
did furnish these additional lists. In the meantime the debtor collected
some of the accounts and put the proceeds back into the business. The
lists of new accounts were accepted in place of the old ones. Just
before the petition in bankruptcy was filed against the debtor, demand
was made upon him by the creditor to pay over the proceeds from
collections. Some money was paid to the creditor.
There was a dispute between the trustee in bankruptcy and the
creditor. The trustee wanted to get the money that had been paid to
the creditor and the creditor wanted a decision by the bankruptcy court
that the unpaid accounts belonged to him. The Court decided against
the creditor on both contentions. The creditor had permitted "unfet-
tered use" by the debtor of the proceeds derived from collections. As
to restoring to the trustee what had been paid over before bankruptcy,
the Court decided that it made no difference whether the creditor knew
or had reason to believe that the debtor was insolvent when the pro-
ceeds were paid. He would have to account in any event because this
was a fraudulent conveyance as a matter of law. The Court felt that
a New York court would have so decided and this was a New York
case.
A mere agreement between the lender and the borrower that the
accounts outstanding shall "belong to" the creditor is not enough to
give the creditor any security interest. Perhaps it does suggest to him
that his debtor has assets in the form of accounts receivable, but it
gives him no interest in the accounts. Nor would the delivery to him
of a formally executed list of accounts outstanding be any more effec-
tive. That is what the creditor probably did have in the Ratner case.
The debtor also must recognize the creditor's dominant interest in the
proceeds from the accounts.
What acts on the part of each are sufficient to indicate that the
debtor does recognize that dominant interest and that the creditor is
demanding protection for it? A mere stamping of the debtor's books
5 Benedict v. Ratner, supra, note 3.
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with a statement of the creditor's claim would not be sufficient. 6 The
creditor's collecting the accounts and then paying any surplus to the
debtor or making new loans and taking new assignments is adequate.7
But that would carry with it considerable burden to the creditor. It is
the kind of burden which a professional financing company might be
willing to carry for a prescribed fee. The debtor's collecting and depos-
iting the proceeds into a separate account to which the creditor only
has access would be enough,8 but the debtor might have to reach a
part of the fund and use some of the proceeds to stay in business.sa
Must the bargain in any event cover only present accounts out-
standing? The accounts may be potential, as for example where a con-
tractor borrows from a bank to complete a job with the builder and
assigns to the bank the retained percentages held by the builder under
the terms of the building contract.9 Other persons may claim a security
interest in the same fund, and while the lender's interest may be
subordinated to that of another claimant, nevertheless, the assignment
is effective.1 0 Future accounts may be assigned to replace old ones.
That happens in bank cases. It may happen in other situations. Provid-
ing the bank or other creditor does not permit the proscribed "unfet-
tered use" of the proceeds derived from collections on the old accounts
the new assignment is effective to give the creditor a security interest
in the new accounts. 1' In some instances the accounts may arise out
of the sale of merchandise in which the creditor has had a specific
lien. The assignment of these future accounts without additional con-
O See Manufacturers Finance Co. v. Armstrong, 78 F. (2d) 289, 291 (C.C.A.
4th, 1935).
7 Cf. In re Bernard & Katz, 38 F. (2d) 40 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930). In this case the
court was trying to distinguish the facts from those in the Ratner case. The
court seemed to be concerned about the matter of returned stocks covered
by accounts already assigned. The court examined the record to discover
whether the debtor had immediately substituted new accounts for the old
ones affected by the returns. Obviously that could not be the only factor to
discover with respect to the matter of "unfettered use." But the court did
call attention to the difference in the case at hand as compared with the Ratner
case in that in the instant case the creditor had reserved the power to collect
the accounts. It is not disclosed in the opinion whether the creditor did make
collections regularly.
8 See Dagget v. Chelsea Trust Co., 73 F. (2d) 614, 616, (C.C.A. 1st, 1934);
Irving 'rust Co. v. Lindner & Bro., Inc., 264 N.Y. 165, 190 N.E. 332 (1934).
Sa A bank, as a creditor, can control a separate account without too much incon-
venience to the debtor. As the proceeds are collected the debtor deposits them
in a special account at the bank. The bank can permit withdrawals from this
account as the debtor substitutes new security in the form of accounts receiv-
able for the accounts already collected. Compare this with the statement in
the text infra.
9 See Wasco County v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., 88 Or. 465, 172 Pac.
126 (1918); cf. Street v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 61 F. (2d) 106 (C.C.A. 9th,
1932) ; Trivison v. Steiner, 41 Ohio App. 35, 179 N.E. 208 (1931).
lo Wasco County v. New England Equitable Ins. Co., supra. note 9.
11 These bank cases and stocks of goods cases will be considered in detail in the
paragraphs that follow.
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sideration may be effective if the creditor insists on recognition of his
dominant interest in the proceeds as collected.
This recognition by the debtor of the creditor's dominant interest
in the accounts means payment of the proceeds by the debtor to the
creditor as the accounts are collected. It means payment of all the
proceeds to cut down the original indebtedness in whole or in part,
or it may mean, in some instances, the substitution of other security,
perhaps new accounts, under circumstances which indicate that the.
creditor is choosing, that he is deciding whether to keep the proceeds,
to accept the additional security, or to make another loan.
The debtor may be a manufacturer or a processor. He owes a
distributor of raw materials on an open account. Any subsequent
assignment of accounts outstanding to secure the claim is a preference
and that follows regardless of any conduct on the part of both indicat-
ing recognition of the creditor's dominant interest in those subsequent
accounts. But the manufacturer may borrow from a finance company
to pay the open account and to pay for more deliveries, and to secure
the loan he may assign to the lender the accounts then on his books.
The manufacturer may even get additional deliveries from the distrib-
utor by reason of an assignment to the latter of all or some oustanding
accounts to secure the general balance between them. So long as the
debtor pays over the proceeds as he collects them to the finance com-
pany or to the distributor, there is no "unfettered use."' 2 There are
two important questions to consider. Have payments on the accounts
been made to the debtor? Has he in turn purported to discharge so
much of the indebtedness with his own creditor as he has agreed to
pay out of each account? If he has done so then the creditor's claim
to any unpaid accounts will not be affected adversely by the debtor's
subsequent bankruptcy.
But suppose the creditor, the finance company or the distributor,
permits the debtor to use the proceeds as collected without paying
anything to the creditor to discharge any part of the balance between
them. Suppose the creditor permits the debtor to so use the proceeds
until the indebtedness matures.14 Or suppose the account between the
two is an open account which is already due or that the creditor is a
finance company and holds the debtor's demand note. No demand is
made for payment or settlement. The creditor, until maturity, or after
taking the note, accepts periodically new lists of accounts in place of
those which the debtor has collected. The creditor would be permitting
"unfettered use" of the proceeds. 5 The case would be like Benedict v.
12 Manufacturers Finance Co. v. Armstrong, 78 F. (2d) 289 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935).
Is Manufacturers Finance Co. v. Armstrong, supra, note 12; In re Gotham Can
Co., 48 F. (2d) 540 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931).
14 See Irvng Trust Co. v. Finance Service Co., 63 F. (2d) 694 (C.C.A. 2d, 1933).
15 Irving Trust Co. v. Finance Service Co., supra, note 14.
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Ratner. The creditor would be unprotected if the debtor were adjudged
a bankrupt.
The creditor may undertake to make a series of advances to the
debtor to enable him to carry labor costs and expenses of operations
over a period of stress. Again the creditor may be a finance company
or a distributor who has. been selling his own product through the
debtor. In any event he bargains with the debtor that in return for
these advances which shall be made from time to time the debtor shall
assign to the creditor the accounts arising from the sales of the
debtor's stock in the immediate course of business."' The proceeds as
collected may have to be used in the debtor's business or new advances
will have to be made by the lender. How can the creditor control the
use of the proceeds and protect his interest in the accounts if the debtor
is thereafter adjudged a bankrupt? That in the beginning the accounts
are future accounts is not material. Perhaps the creditor will have to
bargain for an assignment of all of the debtor's accounts, but this is
a "continuing" transaction.' 7 It would seem that the proceeds will
have to be paid to the creditor as collections are made with the creditor
making new advances as the debtor needs them and crediting the
debtor with the payment of the older loans. Perhaps it is sufficient if
the parties arrange to set-off the payment of the proceeds against the
new advances. Money is in the hands of the debtor. The creditor is
informed about collections and new accounts. He can choose whether
he shall carry the debtor or demand the proceeds. That is not "unfet-
tered use."' 8
A professional lender, a finance company, or a non-professional
lender, a private individual, for example, lends money to a broker to
let him pay a manufacturer or wholesaler for goods to be delivered
directly to the broker's customers. ' His customers are buying on thirty
days credit. The credit accounts are listed and the list is sent to the
lender. Notice of the assignment is given to each customer. If the
1 See Okn v. Isaac Goldman Co., 79 F. (2d) 317 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935); In re
Evansville Broom Co., 29 F. (2d) 643 (C.C.A. 7th, 1928).
- See In re Evansville Broom Co., note 16. Where the first advance is made and
no accounts are assigned and bankruptcy intervenes before the debtor does
business to create the accounts the creditor is obviously unsecured. However,
if the accounts do arise subsequently and if a list is sent to the creditor but
bankruptcy intervenes before any proceeds are collected the creditor's "equit-
able lien" may be recognized. In neither case has there been any "unfettered
use." It is difficult to discover from the few cases available just what does
amount to a "continuing transaction." Cf. Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U.S. 513,
34 Sup. Ct. 166, 58 L.ed. 339 (1913) and Petition of Post, 17 F. (2d) 555
(C.C.A. 1st, 1927).
18 See Chapman v. Emerson, 8 F. (2d) 353 (C.C.A. 4th, 1925); In re Vanity
Fair Shippers, 4 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. N.Y. 1933). The suggestion in the text
which these cases illustrate is pertinent with respect to all of the cases con-
sidered where the creditor is willing to continue the loan.
29 Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U.S. 513, 34 Sup. Ct. 166, 58 L.ed. 339 (1913).
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proceeds are remitted through the lender and if he accounts in turn
to the borrower the case is easy. The creditor assumes the burden of
supervision but he does protect himself. If the accounts are paid by the
customers to the broker it is the same problem. Does he pay over to the
creditor? Is there a series of payments and a series of new loans?
Or does the creditor let the indebtedness stand at some more or less
fixed sum and does he perfunctorily accept new lists of new accounts
as the debtor collects the old ones and continues to carry on business?
A manufacturer or a jobber mriay sell goods or raw materials to a
storekeeper or processor on consignment. The shipper may also bar-
gain for security in the accounts arising from re-sales by the debtor.
Local filing statutes may affect the preservation of the security interest
in the physical goods?0 But suppose the creditor does comply with
the filing statutes. Does he have any interest in the re-sale accounts
which he can enforce against the debtor's estate if the debtor is
adjudged a bankrupt? He does have a security interest in the stock
of goods. The accounts are future accounts but his "equity" will be
recognized.' His interest will be protected providing he has not per-
mitted "unfettered use" of the proceeds from re-sales. 2 Payment must
be made by the debtor as he collects the proceeds. But he may want to
keep his stock up to normal. He wants to check off payments against
new shipments of goods. This creditor is not a banker. He must insist
on payment by the debtor as the latter collects. The creditor may be
willing to send additional shipments on consignment.F3
2oCf. Wis. STAT. (1937) § 241.26.
rlKemp-Booth Co. v. Calvin, 84 F. (2d) 377 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936); In re Burk-
hardt, 14 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Mich. 1935). Cf. Midwest Production Co. v.
Doerner, 70 F. (2d) 195 (C.C.A. 10th, 1934) and the Uniform Chattel Mort-
gage Act, Sections 17 and 19, STURGES, CASES oNr CREDiT TRANSACrIONS (2d
ed. 1936) Appendix. By filing a copy of the mortgage where the security is to
cover a stock of goods to be sold in trade the creditor is protected with respect
to future acquisitions and accounts from sales. The matter of paying pro-
ceeds as collected would still be important. (1936) 20 MARQ. LAW REv. 199.
It is to be noted also that where goods sold out of stock are returned and
the accounts covering the sales have already been assigned and the parties
have agreed that the debtor shall hold the returned goods for the debtor until
a resale can be effected, the creditor has no interest in the goods which he
can assert against a trustee in bankruptcy if he has not filed a copy of the
agreement setting forth his claim in compliance with the local filing statutes.
In re Bernard & Katz, 38 F. (2d) 40 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930); Irving Trust Co. v.
Lindner & Bro., Inc., 264 N.Y. 165, 190 N.E. 332 (1934).
22 The solution as proposed in the text is consistent with the result in the Ratner
case and other cases in which the courts have purported to follow the leading
case, although in no one of the cases is the situation quite the same as that
considered in the text.
2If a number of shipments may be sent, sale on consignment becomes burden-
some. The shipper may not want to file too often. But see WIs. STAT. (1937)
§ 241.26. Perhaps after the first shipment is made and the first accounts arise
by reason of re-sales the creditor will be willing to carry the debtor on an
open account and to take substituted accounts as security. The matter of "un-
fettered use" would be important. Perhaps there can be control of the pro-
ceeds by the creditor without frequent payments and new consignments. See
the text above and footnote 18.
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The bank cases are different from all the others. At least that is
true where the bank carries the debtor's commercial deposit. Any loan
by the bank to its client goes to build up the latter's bank account.
After the loan is made the client is a debtor. The bank holds his short
term paper, a thirty-day, a sixty-day or a ninety-day note. The debtor's
accounts outstanding are pledged to secure the note. The debtor agrees
to assign future accounts. Proceeds from collections are deposited in
the commercial account. The bank can reach any balance in this
account through set-off if the debtor is adjudged a bankrupt.2 But
the bank cannot expect the debtor to keep the balance always at a
level sufficient to cover the loan. Nor can the bank expect the debtor
to carry his business overhead and to discharge the loan by maturity
out of the proceeds from collections. If the note is in fact discharged
on the books by reason of drafts drawn by the debtor and charged to
the account, the probability is that the debtor will have to borrow again
from the bank. The discharging and borrowing would perhaps be a
matter of bookkeeping but even that can be burdensome 2 5
Is it sufficient if the bank requires a new note every 30 or even
every 90 days? Must the bank also insist that the debtor make reports
periodically of outstanding collections and furnish statements of
new accounts? Is the bank thereby in a position to control the use of
the proceeds from collections? The bank is in a position different from
that of the finance company, the lending jobber or the private indi-
vidual. The bank has some control over the proceeds by reason of the
fact that it can refuse to honor checks drawn upon the account unless
the proceeds are used to reduce the indebtedness. It would seem that
the bank can carry the debtor by taking new accounts and accepting
renewals providing it does insist on daily or weekly reports of collec-
tions and assignments.2 6 By reason of the information which the.bank
thus gets, together with the bank's control of the debtor's deposits, it is
in a position to make a choice between accepting or refusing to accept
the substituted security and between continuing or refusing to continue
the loan with the debtor. The bank can decide when the note matures
whether it should renew or cut down or demand liquidation of the
account. The bank's books would show a discharge of the old loan
every time a renewal was accepted and the books would also show
each renewal as a new loan. But that would entail much less bookkeep-
ing and routine work than the other scheme of always paying up,
before maturity, perhaps, by withdrawals, as proceeds from collec-
2 4 Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act. 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C.A. § 108
(1926).
25 Nolen v. Ware Trust Co., 10 F. Supp. 297 (D.C. Mass. 1935).
26 See Daggett v. Chelsea Trust Co., 73 F. (2d) 614 (C.C.A. 1st, 1934) ; Lee v.
State Bank & Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 518 (C.C.A. 2d, 1931); Parker v. Meyer,
37 F. (2d) 556 (C.C.A. 4th, 1930).
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tions are put into the deposit, with the bank crediting the account with
the proceeds of each new note. There will still be the probability that
the bank may abuse its discretion even where it does have detailed
information of the debtor's deposits and new accounts receivable. If
there is any suggestion that renewals are allowed perfunctorily that
might support a finding that the bank has permitted "unfettered use"
of the proceeds from the accounts.2 7
To put these unenforceable assignment cases into the fraudulent
conveyance category is unreal and unnecessary. Yet that is what the
court did in the Ratner case. The payment of the proceeds to the credi-
tor after the period of "unfettered use" by the debtor was not merely
a preference, it was a fraudulent conveyance. The trustee did not have
to begin a plenary suit to get back any payments. He did not have to
show that the creditor had known anything about the debtor's finan-
cial status. With respect to the unpaid accounts, of course, the assignee
in a case like this is in the position of an unsecured creditor. But as
to the proceeds paid over to him before bankruptcy he is worse off.
He must pay back absolutely.
There is some reason to distinguish between the kind of case where
a creditor permits a debtor to keep a stock of goods encumbered by a
recorded or filed mortgage, out of which stock the debtor may sell
and collect the proceeds without paying off the loan before maturity,
and the kind of case like this where the creditor permits the debtor to
use the proceeds from the assigned accounts as the debtor sees fit.
Before the Ratner case even the New York federal courts hesitated
to line up the assignment cases with the stocks of goods cases. They
did not like to carry over the doctrine of "reputed ownership" to in-
tangible accounts. They chose rather to enforce the security in the
accounts even against the trustee. s Perhaps they feared the anomolous
result, that a creditor who had bargained for security in assigned
accounts and had permitted the debtor to use the proceeds as he col-
lected them would be worse off than if he had not bargained for
security at all.
The doctrine of "unfettered use" is not the same as that of
"reputed ownership." The Supreme Court has conceded that. The doc-
21 City Nat. Bank of Beaumont v. Zorn, 68 F. (2d) 566 (C.C.A. 5th, 1934) ; In re
Almond Jones Co., 13 F. (2d) 152 (D.C. Md. 1926).2 8 In re Hub Carpet Co., 282 Fed. 12 (C.C.A. 2d, 1922), the Ratner case in the
intermediate appellate court; In re Michigan Furniture Co., 249 Fed. 978
(S.D. N.Y. 1918). Cf. Petition of Post, 17 F. (2d) 555 (C.C.A. 1st, 1927), in
which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit apparently chose to
repudiate the doctrine of "unfettered use" as a test to determine whether the
creditor had an effective security device. The creditor was protected against
the estate in bankruptcy. The court felt that the decision in the Ratner case
rested on the New York decisions rather than any general proposition of
commercial law.
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trine of "unfettered use" is plausible when it is used to determine
whether a creditor ought to be secured. If a creditor permits a debtor
to make "unfettered use" of the proceeds from the accounts the
creditor is merely trusting to the debtor's promise to pay the debt in
the future. But to classify the payment of proceeds to the creditor
where there has been "unfettered use" as a fraudulent conveyance is
unwise. Any subsequent unsecured creditor of this same debtor, as a
plaintiff in an action against the debtor as a defendant, could reach
through garnishment any proceeds paid over to the creditor, where the
court decides that the security device is not merely ineffective, but
that the conduct of the parties with respect to the debtor's business
makes payment a fraudulent conveyance as a matter of law.?9 The
lien thus acquired could be preserved by the trustee for the benefit
of the estate providing the petition in bankruptcy were filed within
four months after the unsecured creditor had begun his garnishment
action.3 0 It is conceivable then that the trustee may be able to reach
back beyond the four-month period to get proceeds paid to the assignee.
Perhaps this smacks of academic criticism because the debtor is not
likely to have been insolvent over such a long period of time that the
trustee will ever have the chance to reach back beyond the four-month
period. No other creditor may have begun a garnishment proceeding.
Payment of the proceeds so long ago might indicate that the creditor
had not permitted any "unfettered use." Nevertheless, these sugges-
tions indicate that it is unwise to talk "fraudulent conveyance" in
assignment cases. Nor is it necessary to do so to relieve the bankrupt's
estate from the burden of the agreement where the creditor has per-
mitted "unfettered use" of the proceeds. There is one type of case
where the criticism is not academic. That is where the trustee tries
to get back the proceeds for the estate where payments were made dur-
ing the four months before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
The doctrine of "unfettered use" seems consistent with the trend
of decisions in Wisconsin. There is some reason to suppose that the
Wisconsin court might talk "fraudulent conveyance" along with "un-
fettered use." Certainly the doctrine of "reputed ownership" finds
favor in Wisconsin. The chattel mortgage filing statute is construed to
protect the subsequent unsecured creditor of the common debtor where
a mortgagee has not filed a copy of his mortgage. 1 And in those cases
29 National Bank of Commerce v. Brogan, 214 Wis. 378, 253 N.W. 385 (1934);
Morley-Murphy Co. v. Jodar, 220 Wis. 302, 264 N.W. 926 (1936).
30 Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U.S. 288, 35 Sup. Ct. 377, 59 L.ed. 538 (1915). See
Sections 60(b) and 67(f) of the Bankruptcy Act. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 32
STAT. 799 (1903), 36 STAT. 842 (1910), 11 U.S. C.A. § 96(b) (1926) ; 30 STAT.
564 (1898), 48 STAT. 924 (1934), 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(f) (1936).
31 WIs. STAT. (1937) § 241.08; National Bank of Commerce v. Brogan, 214 Wis.
378, 253 N.W. 385 (1934) ; Note (1934) 18 MARQ. LAW REv. 248.
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where the chattel mortgage covers stocks of goods to be sold in trade
the creditor who has complied with the special filing statutes may find
himself unprotected as against subsequent general creditors where he
has permitted the debtor to sell from the stock without immediately
cutting down the indebtedness. In these cases, too, the creditor's posi-
tion is worse than had he not bargained for security, but the courts feel
that he has permitted the debtor to mislead creditors when the debtor
is apparently able to dispose of the stock as he sees fit. Most courts
which have had an opportunity to consider it have used the doctrine
of "unfettered use" to determine whether a creditor is secured or un-
secured. Even the federal courts in New York have refused to treat
the payment of proceeds to a creditor like the one in the Ratner case
as anything more than a preference.
S2Morler-Murphy Co. v. Jodar, 220 Wis. 302, 264 N.W. 926 (1936); Vanden
Wymelenberg v. Badger Furnace Co., 220 Wis. 473, 265 N.W. 718 (1936);
Ross v. State Bank of Trego, 198 Wis. 335, 224 N.W. 114, 73 A.L.R. 225
(1929) ; (1936) 20 MARQ. LAw REv. 199.
* In re Borok, 50 F. (2d) 75 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) ; Walradt v. Miller, 45 F. (2d)
686 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930); in accord, J. W. Fales & Co. v. 0. H. Seiple Co., 171
Wash. 630, 19 P. (2d) 118 (1933).
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